Emigration and political institutions in Africa: A macro Approach**

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Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of the disparities in the levels of democracy in Africa. Taking the end of the Cold War as a quasi-natural experiment for African countries, we find a robust positive relationship between the share of the emigrant population in the 1970-1980s and the outcome of democratic transitions in the origin countries of emigrants from Africa. Additionally, the marginal effect of emigration on democracy decreases according to the duration of the migrant population in the host countries: the longer the duration of the migrant population, the greater the impact on democracy, *ceteris paribus*. The supportive evidence demonstrates that a larger population of emigrants enabled citizens to develop an independent civil society. In contrast, a small emigrant population during autocratic rule did not allow such development. In this case, the incumbents retained their bargaining power and determined the agenda of the transitions; consequently, institutional changes were less likely to occur. This result is robust to various sensitivity analyses, including estimation methods as well as endogeneity issues.

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1. Introduction

Since the early 1990s, Sub-Saharan African countries have embarked on democratic transitions, yet the outcomes have been mixed. While some countries, such as Ghana and Mali, have recorded success in their democratic transitions, others such as Cameroon have shown poor progress in democracy (e.g., Polity IV Project, Marshall et al., 2015). This variation among countries with important economic similarities casts doubt on the conventional factors affecting democratic transition and consolidation. This observation is further exacerbated by the fact that, not many years ago, particularly during the period from 1970-1980, almost all African countries were ruled by political regimes ranked as autocratic (Polity IV Project, Marshall et al, 2015). This raises a question of interest: Why are some African countries succeeding in their democracy transitions while others are failing?

This paper aims to provide new evidence that will contribute toward addressing this issue. Specifically, we posit that the stock of African emigrants in the OECD countries prior to the wave of democratic transitions in Africa positively affected the contemporaneous (1990-2010) levels of democracy in the concerned countries. Our main argument is that a larger population of emigrants enabled citizens to develop an independent civil society during autocratic rule. In contrast, a smaller migrant population during autocratic rule did not allow such development. In this case, the incumbents retained their bargaining power and determined the agenda of the transition to democracy, making institutional changes less likely. The country cases and empirical tests investigated within this paper support this channel for the empowerment of civil society, through which emigration operates on democracy in Africa.

So far, the few studies that have investigated the factors underlying the democracy movements in Africa have highlighted resource wealth, including oil wealth, as the main explanatory factor for this issue (e.g., Jensen and Wantchékon, 2004; Omgba, 2009; Arezki and Gylfason, 2013). However, more recent studies have supported the position that past events can explain present democracy outcomes in Africa. Specifically, Wantchékon and García-Ponce (2014) argued that African countries that have experienced *rural* insurgencies during anti-colonial movements tend to have autocratic regimes, while those that have faced *urban* protests tend to have more democratic institutions. The present study follows this approach in assessing the long-term consequences of past events on contemporaneous democracy performance. However, we highlight a distinct factor by investigating the role of the emigrant population over the period 1970-1980 in explaining contemporary levels of democracy in Africa – a point that was not examined in the aforementioned studies.

By focusing on the relationship between migration and democratic transition, this study joins a still growing body of literature on the role of emigration on institutional quality, which has been especially highlighted by the contributions of Spilimbergo (2009) and Docquier et al. (2016). However, although we follow this strand of literature by studying the aforementioned relationship

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at the macro level, our study differs from the preceding ones in several ways. It is particularly interested in the entire spectrum of migrants, unlike Spilimbergo (2009), who looked at the impact of foreign students on democracy. Furthermore, while Docquier et al. (2016) were interested in the level of democracy, i.e., they looked at whether countries with many migrants are more democratic than others, our paper focuses on the transition to democracy, meaning the transition from an autocratic regime to a democratic regime. Additionally, none of the aforementioned papers highlighted and tested the channel through which emigration affects democracy. In contrast, this paper advocates the proposition that emigration affects democratic transitions in Africa through the channel of civil society. We also demonstrate the presence of this channel through empirical tests. Overall, our paper suggests that the waves of democratization in the 1990s created a window of opportunity for institutional change (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Bruckner and Ciccone, 2011), and the African countries that successfully exploited this window of opportunity for democratic change are those with the highest stocks of emigrants at the time of this wave of democratization.

By its focus on Africa, this study also extends the African case studies on the role of emigration on political change (e.g., Batista and Vicente, 2011). In a voting experience, Batista and Vicente (2011) found a positive relationship between migration intensity and the demand for transparency and democracy in Cape Verde. However, unlike micro studies related to specific cases, the present study is interested in the whole set of Sub-Saharan African countries. It therefore highlights more inferences than the previous studies. Moreover, the focus on the relationship between the emigrant population, over the period 1970-1980, and the contemporaneous levels of democracy is also a distinct feature of this study. Specifically, it provides evidence of a gap between the time when the migrants get settled and their possible effect on democracy in the country of origin. Indeed, it makes sense to consider whether it would take several years of investment by migrants to establish a civil society independent from the political system. Additionally, there is evidence that when people emigrate, they are more involved in ensuring their basic needs than in trying to immediately change the governance in their country of origin. The progressive fulfillment of these needs contributes toward the migrants' ability to participate more actively in the public debate in their country of origin. Our empirical tests demonstrate these points.

To sum up, for a sample of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries, we find a positive and significant relationship between the stock of migrants in the OECD countries during the period 1970-1980 and the contemporary levels of democracy. We also demonstrate that this effect of emigrants passes through the channel of the empowerment of civil society, while the marginal effect decreases according to the duration of the emigrant population in the host countries: the longer the duration of the emigrant population, the greater the impact on democracy, *ceteris paribus*. These results are robust to the inclusion of other factors that have previously been considered as determinants of democracy in Africa, including anti-colonial movements. They are also robust to estimation methods, as well as endogeneity issues.

The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the background of democracy in Africa and provides arguments that help to interpret the empirical results. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical estimation, and Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 explores the role of the emergence of an independent civil society as a channel underlying our empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and draws policy implications.

2. Background and stylized facts on emigration and democratic transition in Africa

When the African states gained their independence, predominantly in the 1960s, there was no common objective that unified their diverse populations. The colonial rule had established political entities within artificial boundaries combining distinct ethnicities (Alesina et al., 2011; Ali et al., 2015). Specifically, these diverse ethnicities had their own institutional rules; some demonstrated democratic functioning, while others did not (Quantin, 2001; Owona, 2015). The new post-colonial leaders faced the challenge of unifying these diverse entities with different institutional arrangements under a common rule and with a common destiny.

However, as they lacked popular legitimacy, the post-colonial leaders used methods similar to those of the colonial states, including political violence and coercion, in order to legitimize their power (Menard, 1991; Petithomme, 2007). Thus, in the aftermath of the 1960s, autocratic regimes were present almost in all the African countries. However, this golden era (1970-1980s) of the dictators was challenged at the beginning of the 1990s by democratic transitions. The difficult economic environment, particularly the adverse shocks of commodity prices, caused the resources these dictators needed to buy off wide-ranging popular support to be scarce. Internal pressures, including multiple general strikes and the claims of students, led to the emergence of opposition that demanded free and transparent elections. Upheavals in the international arena, including the end of the Cold War, brought about external pressures that completed the squaring of the circle for the democratization of these former authoritarian bastions (Gueye, 2009). Table 1 and Figure 1 report these developments in the African states by showing the evolution of several institutional indices.

These indices include Polity 2 (P2) from the Polity IV Project of Marshall et al. (2015), political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) published by the Freedom House, and voice and accountability from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The P2 score varies between negative values (-10, complete autocracy) and positive ones (+10, complete democracy); the PR and CL indices range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free); the VA index ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong governance outcome) (see Section 3 for the detailed description of the indices).[1] In Figure 1, we also include an index of the independence of civil society (the Core Civil Society index (CCS)), which is drawn from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. To allow

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[1] Notice that the Voice and Accountability index is not considered in Table 1 because it only became available in 1996.

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comparison, each index is normalized within 0 to 1, and a higher value indicates more institutional strength.

Table 1: Democracy transition in Africa

Index	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Polity 2 in 1980	0.272	0.270	0.000	0.950
Polity 2 in 1995	0.507	0.281	0.050	1.000
Political Right in 1980	0.244	0.260	0.000	0.833
Political Right in 1995	0.408	0.340	0.000	1.000
Civil Liberties in 1980	0.259	0.196	0.000	0.667
Civil Liberties in 1995	0.408	0.248	0.000	0.833

Notes: Each democracy index is normalized from 0 to 1. Higher score indicates more democratic institutions/independent civil society.

As can be seen in Table 1, all the democracy indicators, initially weak in 1980, increased significantly during the post-Cold War period (1995). For instance, in 1980, the P2 index in Africa ranged between 0 (for Swaziland) and 1 (for Mauritius), with an average of 0.272 and a standard deviation of 0.270. In 1995, the average value increased to 0.507. Using the PR or the CL index, one can also observe an increase in the average level. Figure 1 shows that there was also an increase in the degree of the independence of civil society (CCS index) and confirms these institutional developments during the end of the Cold War. Thus, on average, a wave of democracy was present in the different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. However, from this period onwards, the African countries began to show different evolutions in their political institutions, as illustrated by the increase in the variance of the three indicators of democracy (Table 1). In other words, some African countries shifted from autocratic rule towards democracy, but others remained under autocratic rule. Hence, there appears to be a puzzle regarding why some African countries are succeeding in their democratic transitions, while others are failing.

Figure 1: Democracy transition

Notes: Each democracy index is normalized from 0 to 1. Higher score indicates more democratic institutions.

We argue that one of the factors that enabled the success of democracy in some African countries is the role played by the diaspora. We provide evidence that this role was critical for countries with a larger stock of emigrants before the wave of democracy in the 1990s. Specifically, a larger stock of emigrants in 1970-1980s increased the likelihood of success in the democratic transitions of the 1990-2000s, *ceteris paribus*. Although one can acknowledge different channels in the relationship between emigration and the quality of political institutions (Li and McHale, 2009), evidence from the African case pleads strongly in favor of the role of emigrants in the emergence of a civil society independent from political power. This independent civil society played a key role in the success of the democratic transitions in Africa (Thiriot, 2002).

Mali, often taken as an example of a successful transition (e.g., Daum and Le Gay, 2005), can constitute an obvious illustration of the above point. Daum and Le Gay (2005) provided evidence that, during the 1970-1980s, Malian emigrants, particularly those present in France, created hundreds of associations aimed at the development of their region of origin. Thus, these associations provided collective goods to the villagers (schools, hospitals, and so on), and in

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some cases, they mutualized their resources in inter-village associations, forming powerful tools that intervened simultaneously in several regions of the country.

Beyond the improvement in the living standards of the concerned populations, these interventions of emigrants influenced their participation in the public debate. Indeed, emigrants were far from the collective goods and services that they purchased for the beneficiaries, the regions' inhabitants, but they established organizations for the daily management of these collective infrastructures. These organizations were places for public debate, and they were the few spaces in which there was free expression on matters of public life under authoritarian rule (Thiriot, 2002). The dictatorship had an interest in keeping these organizations under control. It responded by placing representatives of the state party within these organizations, but they were soon surpassed because of the extent of their multiplication (Daum and Le Gay, 2005). Thus, thanks to the emigrants, a civil society independent from political power emerged during the years of the dictatorship of the 1970-1980s. Thiriot (2002) argued that this Malian civil society, through well-organized public demonstrations, put pressure on the authoritarian power of the time, which finally fell in 1991. From 1991 to 1992, this civil society participated in the co-management of the country during the transition phase through the Transition Committee (*Comité de transition pour le salut du peuple (CTSP)*). This committee, which was in charge of the presidential and legislative prerogatives, organized a national conference (*Conférence nationale souveraine*) that set up a new constitution that guarantees civil liberties and establishes free and transparent elections (Thiriot, 2002).

The path taken by the democratic transition in Mali diverges from those of countries like Cameroon, with which it shared autocratic rule in the 1970-1980s. In 1980, for example, the democracy index of Polity IV was -7 in Mali and -8 in Cameroon; both countries therefore had authoritarian regimes. However, in the 1990s, the same democracy index displayed +7 in Mali, supporting that Mali had shifted towards democratic rule. In contrast, for Cameroon, the index still displayed a negative score of -4, supporting that the country was still under authoritarian rule. As described above, we argue that the divergence in the stock of emigrants in the 1970-1980s may constitute an explanatory factor for the relative success of the democratic transition in Mali vis-à-vis the experience of Cameroon. Indeed, on this point, the stock of Malian emigrants in the OECD countries in 1980 was 16,345 in absolute terms, while Cameroonian emigrants did not even reach half of this number in the same year, with 8,683 emigrants. At the same time, the population was lower in Mali (7 million) as compared to Cameroon (8.9 million), making the emigration rate – 0.95 per thousand people – of Cameroon more than 2.3 times lower than that of Mali (2.31 per thousand people).

Stated this way, one question that might emerge is how this divergence in the stock of emigrants in 1980 interfered in the path of the democratic transition in Cameroon vis-à-vis that of Mali? As noted above, thanks to its emigrants, Mali successfully developed a civil society during the period of dictatorship that was independent from political power. This well-established civil society took the lead in the transition when the wave of democratization occurred. In other words,

it was the Malian civil society that decided the agenda and the content of the democratic transition.

Figure 2: Migration and Democracy transition in Africa

Notes: Each democracy index is normalized from 0 to 1. Higher score indicates more democratic institutions.

In Cameroon, the small emigrant population in the 1970-1980s did not make the development of such an independent civil society possible. In the absence of this civil society, at the time of the democratic wave, the ruler of the country took control of the transition process. Sindjoun (1994) argued that in the 1990s, it was the ruling incumbent who determined the content and the agenda of the democratic transition in Cameroon. Thus, despite the proliferation of strikes of the opposition calling for the organization of a national conference (outside of government control) as in Mali, the incumbent President instead convened a tripartite meeting in 1991 between the opposition, the government and some so-called "independent" personalities, including religious and traditional leaders, who had previously been appointed by the government. The ruling incumbent set the agenda of the meeting and appointed his Prime Minister to preside over the meeting. Therefore, there were no institutional changes aimed at challenging the power of the incumbent ruler. From that date, Mali's performance in terms of democracy fundamentally differs from that of Cameroon, which has remained low. Even after the military coup of 2012 in

Mali, its political institutions showed great resilience, and they quickly returned to their normal functioning. Mali still shows a solid lead in democratic institutions (e.g., +5, in polity 2 index) over Cameroon, which is still considered to be autocratic (e.g., -4, in polity 2 index).

This difference between Cameroon and Mali is in line with the more general scope in Figure 2, which compares the evolution of democracy and independence of civil society in countries with low emigration rates (below the median) in 1980 to that of countries with high emigration rates (above the median) in 1980. In Figure 2, Mauritius is excluded, because in the 1980s, this country was already democratic, making it an outlier with respect to the evolution of the other African countries. Whatever the index, there is clear evidence of greater promotion of democracy in countries with a larger diaspora abroad than in countries with a smaller diaspora in 1980. At the same time, the degree of independence of civil society is greater in countries that have more migrants abroad, before and after the end of the Cold War. This is in line with our conjecture, which argues that the stock of African emigrants prior to the wave of democratic transitions positively influenced the contemporaneous democracy levels through the channel of the emergence of an independent civil society during the autocratic rule. However, because other factors may come into play to explain the divergence in democratic schemes, a careful empirical analysis is needed. That is the purpose of the following section.

3. Data

To empirically estimate the effect of pre-1990 emigration on the democratic transitions in Africa, we rely on data collected on 47 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (see the Appendix for the list of countries).

The Polity 2 (P2) index, drawn from the Polity IV database of Marshall et al. (2015), will be our main indicator of democracy. It is worth noting that this variable is the one most used in similar studies (see Wantchékon and García-Ponce, 2014), thus facilitating the comparison of our results with those of other studies. The P2 index is a composite index based on several concepts of democracy such as: the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The P2 score varies between negative values (-10, complete autocracy) and positive ones (+10, complete democracy), and data are available since 1800 for all independent countries with a total population greater than 500,000 in 2015 (167 countries in 2015).

Although the Polity 2 index is the most used index of democracy, it is often argued that this variable might not account for all the dimensions of democracy. Therefore, as robustness checks, we will consider other indicators of democracy: the civil liberties (CL) and political rights (PR)

indices of Freedom House (see Freedom House, 2014) and the voice and accountability (VA) index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (see WGI, 2014).

The Freedom House PR and CL indicators are an overall measure of democracy. The PR index is a measure based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions that are grouped into three subcategories: electoral processes (3 questions), political pluralism and participation (4 questions), and functioning of the government (3 questions). The CL index is based on 15 civil liberties questions that are grouped into four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief (4 questions), associational and organizational rights (3 questions), rule of law (4 questions), and personal autonomy and individual rights (4 questions). The total scores awarded to the PR and CL checklists are translated into ratings ranging from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free).

The VA index of the WGI allows perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as the freedom of expression, the freedom of association, and a free media to be captured. It ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).

To make our results perfectly comparable across different measures of democracy, following Acemoglu et al. (2008), we normalize each indicator on a scale ranging from 0 (completely autocratic/least free/weak) to 1 (completely democratic/most free/strong).

To proxy for the degree of independence of civil society, we use the newly built database of V-Dem (2016), which provides an index of the independence of civil society. This index, named the core civil society (CCS) index, is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, i.e. a civil society that enjoys autonomy from the state and that freely and actively pursues its political and civic goals (V-Dem, 2016).[2] It is expressed in an interval scale between 0 (lowest) and 1 (highest).

As in Docquier et al. (2016), we use the database of Brucker et al. (2013) – a database on international migration that covers information for 20 OECD destination countries by gender, country of origin and educational level, for the years 1980-2010 (5-year intervals) – to construct our variable of interest, the stock of African migrants in the OECD countries during the 1970-1980s.[3] To construct the geography-based predictor of emigration stocks (see Section 4.2), we rely on geographic variables (country size, proxied by population and area; bilateral distance; colonial ties) from the CEPII's Gravity database described in Head et al. (2010).

Data on macroeconomic control variables, such as real GDP per capita, trade openness (the sum of imports and exports over GDP), population, and oil rents/GDP are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI, 2015) database. We take other control variables from

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[2] For a description of the data, see Lindberg et al. (2014).
[3] We obtain similar empirical results using the alternative data source of Ozden et al. (2011), which provides a global bilateral migration database from 1960 to 2000 in ten-year intervals.

various sources: ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003); distance from the equator from Rodrik et al. (2004); legal origin from La Porta et al. (2008); nature of the independence movements (rural insurgency versus urban protest) from Wantchékon and García-Ponce (2014).

Descriptive statistics for the selected variables of interest are reported in Table 2. For time-varying variables, summary statistics are computed using observations used in cross-sectional regressions (over the period 1991-2010).

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std dev.	Min	Max
Polity 2	45	0.517	0.229	0.043	1.000
Political Rights	47	0.414	0.281	0.000	0.992
Civil Liberties	47	0.449	0.216	0.000	0.892
Voice and Accountability	47	0.373	0.144	0.122	0.673
Core Civil Society	46	0.678	0.215	0.084	0.947
Emig. Rate in 1980	47	0.005	0.016	0.000	0.100
GDP per capita (in log)	44	7.649	0.879	6.206	9.808
Population (in log)	47	15.561	1.574	11.293	18.652
Trade (as % of GDP)	47	77.930	46.362	28.627	273.114
Ethnic fractionalization	46	0.655	0.232	0.000	0.930
Dist. From equator (in degrees)	47	10.660	7.710	0.000	29.000
Oil rents (as % of GDP)	46	5.807	13.854	0.000	52.904
French leg. origin	46	0.630	0.488	0.000	1.000
Rural insurgency	41	0.463	0.505	0.000	1.000

Notes: For time-varying variables summary statistics are computed using observations used in cross-sectional regressions (over the period 1990-2010).

4. Empirical analysis

Our study aims to explain the disparities in the contemporary performance of democracy in African countries. For this purpose, we hypothesize that the stock of African emigrants in the 1970-1980s in the OECD countries has had a positive effect on current democracy development. Therefore, the relationship under examination is:

$$contemporary\ democracy = f(pre1990\ emigration, X) \qquad (1)$$

where X is a set of control variables.

To estimate this relationship, we employ a number of empirical strategies. First, we implement a series of cross-sectional OLS regressions of post-1990 democracy on the 1980 stock of emigrants

in the OECD as a share of the home population (pre-1990 emigration rate), controlling for a number of potential determinants of institutional quality. Second, we employ an instrumental variables approach on the cross-sectional data to address potential endogeneity issues. Finally, we use the fixed effects panel model to address potential additional concerns regarding unobserved heterogeneity.

4.1. OLS estimates

In the first sequence, we will consider the following OLS model on the cross-sectional data:

$$Democ_{1991-2010,i} = \alpha + \gamma Emig_{1980,i} + \beta X_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

where i stands for country index, X is a set of control variables and ε_i is the disturbance term. The dependent variable $Democ_{1991-2010}$ is the average of the democracy index over the period 1991-2010; $Emig_{1980}$ is the 1980 stock of emigrants as the share of the home population.

4.1.1. Basic evidence

Table 3 reports the estimation results of Equation (2) with the Polity 2 index as a proxy for democracy.[4] In these estimations, we include a subset of the contemporaneous controls that were found to be important for the current institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004): the log of real GDP per capita, the log of the average population size, the openness variable measured by the sum of exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP, and the ethnic fractionalization variable.

Table 3: Basic evidence

	(1) P2	(2) P2	(3) P2	(4) P2	(5) P2	(6) P2
Emig. 1980	4.548***	4.718***	5.110***	4.650***	4.761***	4.635***
	(0.424)	(0.754)	(1.066)	(0.484)	(0.756)	(1.159)
Ln GDP pc		-0.038				-0.021
		(0.060)				(0.070)
Ln population			0.019			-0.002
			(0.029)			(0.033)
Trade				-0.001		-0.001
				(0.001)		(0.001)
Ethnic. frac.					0.082	0.021
					(0.194)	(0.193)
Constant	0.507***	0.803	0.209	0.572***	0.451***	0.754
	(0.034)	(0.435)	(0.466)	(0.063)	(0.148)	(0.759)
Observations	44	41	44	42	44	40
R-squared	0.091	0.108	0.102	0.119	0.097	0.126

Notes: The dependent variable is the post-1990 Polity 2 index, measured as the average level of the Polity 2 index for each country between 1991 and 2010. For time-varying control variables, the regressions use their average values between 1991 and 2010. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.

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[4] Since before the end of the Cold War, Mauritius has had the highest possible score on the democracy index (Polity 2 score of +10, i.e. complete democracy); therefore, it is excluded from the regression sample.

In column 1 of Table 3, the relationship is tested without control variables; in columns 2-6, the control variables are included in the regression. The results in column 1 provide evidence of a positive impact of early emigration on the democracy level in the period from 1991-2010, and this impact is significant at the 1% level. When each control variable is added separately or all the controls are added together in columns 2-6, this positive impact remains significant at the 1% level with roughly the same magnitude, while the control variables are not significant. Therefore, all the regressions in Table 3 support our conjecture that early emigration has contributed toward promoting post-Cold War democracy in Africa.

4.1.2. Additional Controls

The focus on emigration in the 1970-1980s, the period that preceded the wave of democratic renewal in Africa, highlights the historical prism of the relationship between emigration and institutional change. However, several historical and geographical factors are often highlighted in the literature to explain the institutional variance. Therefore, concerns can be raised about the results in Table 3 on the basis that the inclusion of these other factors could alter the above conclusion.

To take this potential concern into account, we extend the set of controls by adding many geographical and historical variables that have been found to influence institutional quality. The geographical controls are the distance from the equator and the endowment of natural resources (oil). The distance from the equator is expected to have a positive impact on institutional quality, because latitude is correlated with "Western Europe influence" (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004). Oil rents are used to capture the fact that natural resource dependence hinders democracy (Ross, 2001), particularly through the rent-seeking behavior of the political elite (Omgba, 2015).

As historical covariate, we use a French legal origin dummy, because the legal origin based on colonial history (English Common Law or French Commercial Code) has been found to matter to current institutions (La Porta et al., 1999, La Porta et al., 2008).[5]

We also consider another historical covariate, the nature of the independence movements, which has recently been highlighted by Wantchékon and García-Ponce (2014) as a relevant factor for democratic development in Africa. Specifically, Wantchékon and García-Ponce (2014) argued that anti-colonial *urban* protests generated norms of peaceful political expression and compromise leading to the cultural bases for liberal democracy. Conversely, *rural* insurgencies characterized by armed rebellions have caused a culture of political exclusion conducive to the use of violence as a form of political expression and conflict resolution. The authors found corroborating evidence that African countries that have experienced rural insurgencies during anti-colonial movements have tended to have autocratic regimes, while those that faced urban protests have tended to have more democratic institutions.

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[5] In our sample, the countries either have a French or English legal origin.

Table 4: Additional controls

	(1) P2	(2) P2	(3) P2	(4) P2	(5) P2	(6) P2
Emig. 1980	4.635***	4.657***	4.820***	4.561***	3.541**	3.817***
	(1.159)	(1.104)	(1.092)	(1.143)	(1.382)	(1.140)
Ln GDP pc	-0.021	-0.046	-0.033	0.010	0.002	-0.008
	(0.070)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.043)
Ln population	-0.002	-0.011	-0.012	0.005	-0.001	0.003
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Trade	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnic. frac.	0.021	0.176	0.036	0.153	-0.114	0.195
	(0.193)	(0.198)	(0.196)	(0.210)	(0.228)	(0.237)
Dist. equator		0.013***				0.013***
		(0.004)				(0.004)
French leg. origin			-0.069			0.004
			(0.075)			(0.072)
Oil rents				-0.006**		-0.004*
				(0.002)		(0.002)
Rural ins.					-0.134*	-0.114*
					(0.076)	(0.066)
Constant	0.754	0.820	1.014	0.299	0.742	0.340
	(0.759)	(0.672)	(0.787)	(0.793)	(0.770)	(0.674)
Observations	40	40	40	40	37	37
R-squared	0.126	0.291	0.145	0.218	0.198	0.488

Notes: The dependent variable is the post-1990 Polity 2 index, measured as the average level of the polity 2 index for each country between 1991 and 2010. For time-varying control variables, the regressions use their average values between 1991 and 2010. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.

The results using additional controls are reported in Table 4. As in Table 3, the results in Table 4 show a positive impact of the 1980 emigration on post-1990 democracy that is significant at the 1% level (5% level in column 5). Therefore, even considering an extensive set of controls, early emigration has had a significant positive impact on the development of democracy in Africa.

4.1.3. Alternative indicators of democracy

A possible concern might be related to the use of the Polity 2 variable as a measure of democracy. Indeed, although this variable is the most used in the empirical field (see Wantchékon and García-Ponce (2014), it can be argued that the Marshall and Jaggers Polity IV database does not accurately assess the real state of democracy.

It is worth noting that by definition, institutions are not quantifiable; therefore, their quality is measured on the basis of perceptions, and in this case, it is very difficult to distinguish *de jure* democracy from and *de facto* democracy. However, we are aware that this point might limit the

scope of the present and similar studies. Thus, we respond to this possible concern by investigating the above relationship through the other dimensions of democracy identified in the literature (see Olsson, 2009). To this end, we also consider the political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) indices of Freedom House (see Freedom House, 2014) and the voice and accountability (VA) index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). As mentioned above, the Freedom House PR and CL indices aim to evaluate the civil liberties and political rights enjoyed by people, while the VA index of the WGI captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as the freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media.

Table 5: Alternative indicators of democracy

	(1) PR	(2) PR	(3) CL	(4) CL	(5) VA	(6) VA
Emig. 1980	5.901***	5.113***	4.125***	3.653***	3.048***	2.625***
	(1.224)	(1.134)	(0.829)	(0.884)	(0.634)	(0.538)
Ln GDP pc	0.035	0.026	0.053	0.037	0.036	0.039
	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.023)
Ln population	-0.014	-0.019	-0.016	-0.023	0.001	0.004
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Trade	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnic. frac.	0.069	0.328*	0.066	0.295**	0.017	0.147
	(0.170)	(0.189)	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.087)	(0.102)
Dist. equator		0.014***		0.009***		0.006***
		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.002)
Oil rents		-0.005*		-0.003		-0.003**
		(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.001)
French leg. origin		-0.035		-0.022		-0.012
		(0.083)		(0.061)		(0.037)
Rural ins.		-0.136*		-0.141**		-0.070*
		(0.075)		(0.058)		(0.036)
Constant	0.383	0.274	0.343	0.378	0.114	-0.077
	(0.734)	(0.671)	(0.549)	(0.472)	(0.383)	(0.293)
Observations	41	37	41	37	41	37
R-squared	0.189	0.544	0.230	0.533	0.222	0.582

Notes: The dependent variable is the post-1990 democracy index, measured as the average level of the corresponding democracy index for each country between 1991 and 2010. For time-varying control variables, the regressions use their average values between 1991 and 2010. Heroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.

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Table 5 reports the results of the regressions using the PR, CL and VA indices as the dependent variables. Regardless of the index, there is evidence of a positive impact of pre-1990 emigration on post-1990 democracy that is significant at the 1% level, and the estimated coefficient is close to the one above based on the P2 index. This finding holds even when we consider an extensive set of control variables. Therefore, regardless of the measure of democracy, we find a positive influence of the pre-1990 diaspora on contemporary democracy levels in African countries, 15

confirming that the higher the stock of emigrants in 1980, the higher the levels of democracy in African countries, *ceteris paribus*.

4.2. Two-stage least squares estimation

Throughout of this paper, we have assumed that the stock of emigrants in 1980 is exogenous with respect to the current levels of democracy in Africa. Several factors might contribute to this. For example, it is difficult to support the notion that there is reverse causality between the two variables, because democracy in 1991-2010 cannot cause the emigration of Africans over the period 1970-1980. Even though it can be noted that the quality of institutions can influence the desire to emigrate (as host countries with good institutions may attract more potential emigrants) and the possibility to emigrate (emigration costs are likely high in home countries with poor institutions), it is unlikely that this drives our previous results. In particular, our study is a quasi-natural experiment in which almost all the countries were under authoritarian regimes, which could thus influence the ability to emigrate. But only part of them shifted to democracy in the 1990-2000s, rather than all. The others remained under authoritarian rule, which gives rise to the puzzle.

Taking the above into consideration, one might argue that some initial conditions or some events in the past (e.g., political instability generated by a coup) cannot be captured by our controls and could have influenced pre-1990 emigration and the current institutional arrangements in the concerned countries, and these events might appear to be specific to each country. We take these endogeneity concerns into account using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation strategy.

Our 2SLS estimation strategy follows recent developments in the migration literature (Ortega and Peri, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016; Docquier et al., 2016) and highlighted in the trade literature (Frankel and Romer, 1999). Specifically, based on a pseudo-gravity regression, we construct a geography-based prediction of the bilateral migration stocks born in country i and living in country j as a share of the home population, $\widehat{Emig}_{ij}$. This geography-based prediction of the bilateral migration stocks is obtained by estimating the following pseudo-gravity model:

$$lnEmig_{ij} = \delta + \lambda_1 lnDist_{ij} + \lambda_2 lnPop_i + \lambda_3 lnArea_i$$
$$+ \lambda_4 Colony_{ij} + \mu_j + e_{ij} \tag{3}$$

where $Dist_{ij}$, the weighted distance that is equal to the distance between the home country i and the destination country j based on the bilateral distances between the biggest cities of the two countries, is a proxy of the migration costs; Pop_i and $Area_i$ denote the population and the area of the origin country i, respectively, and are used to capture the capacity of the home country to send migrants abroad; $Colony_{ij}$ is a dummy for the colonial relationship between the origin country i and the destination country j, and it takes into account the importance of colonial ties

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on bilateral migration. In our case of SSA countries, the variables (population and area) of destination countries were not found to be relevant in the regression estimation. However, μ_j is used to account for potential destination-country fixed effects.

The predicted emigration as the share of the home population, $\widehat{Emig}_i$, is then obtained by summing up the bilateral predicted emigration share over the host countries ($\sum_j \widehat{Emig}_{ij}$). Therefore, in the 2SLS strategy, the gravity-based predicted emigration share ($\widehat{Emig}_i$) is used to instrument the observed emigration share, $Emig_i$.

To estimate the pseudo-gravity, we use the non-linear approach of the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML). Following Silva and Tenreyro (2010), we address the identification problem of the (pseudo) maximum likelihood estimates of the Poisson regression models with the non-negative value of the dependent variable (bilateral migration) and a large number of zeros on some regressors. As argued by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), a PPML estimation is more appropriate than a log-linearized model estimation by OLS, because the PPML estimation has the advantage of considering the observations with a zero value on the dependent variable (bilateral migration) and to deal with issues that occur under heteroskedasticity. Table A-1 reports the results of the pseudo-gravity model on the 1980 stock of emigrants as the share of the home population. The results show that bilateral distance, origin country size (population and area) and colonial links largely explain the bilateral migration stocks.

Table 6: 2SLS estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	P2	P2	PR	PR	CL	CL	VA	VA
Emig. 1980	4.271***	4.049***	9.179***	5.430***	7.169***	3.697***	4.247***	2.811***
	(0.915)	(1.528)	(3.167)	(1.878)	(2.436)	(1.266)	(1.236)	(0.902)
Ln GDP pc		-0.020		0.037		0.054		0.037
		(0.065)		(0.061)		(0.043)		(0.031)
Ln population		-0.005		-0.016		-0.019		0.000
		(0.032)		(0.032)		(0.023)		(0.017)
Trade		-0.001		-0.001		-0.001*		-0.001
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Ethnic. frac.		0.021		0.069		0.067		0.017
		(0.179)		(0.158)		(0.112)		(0.081)
Constant	0.508***	0.794	0.357***	0.417	0.406***	0.374	0.346***	0.131
	(0.034)	(0.706)	(0.039)	(0.690)	(0.031)	(0.515)	(0.021)	(0.360)
Observations	44	40	46	41	46	41	46	41
R-squared	0.090	0.124	0.161	0.188	0.158	0.229	0.162	0.222
K-P F-stat	34	54.52	9.146	26.61	9.146	26.61	9.146	26.61
SY 10% max IV size	16.38	16.38	16.38	16.38	16.38	16.38	16.38	16.38
SY 25% max IV size	5.530	5.530	5.530	5.530	5.530	5.530	5.530	5.530

Notes: The dependent variable is the post-1990 democracy index, measured as the average level of the corresponding democracy index for each country between 1991 and 2010. For time-varying control variables, the regressions use their average values between 1991 and 2010. Emigration rate is instrumented by the predicted value of emigration rate that is obtained by the non-linear gravity estimates. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. K-P F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat that is to be compared with critical values (SY 10% max IV size and SY 25% max IV size) provided by Stock and Yogo (2005).

The results of the 2SLS estimation are reported in Table 6. Due to a small number of observations, and because the 2SLS strategy tackles the omitted variables problem and including an extensive vector of the control variables weakens the exogeneity assumptions required for the validity of the instruments, the estimations in Table 6 consider the narrow set of control variables used in Table 3. Before commenting on the 2SLS results, it is important to check the relevance of the gravity-based instruments. To this end, we consider the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk Wald F-stat test (KP test), which tests for the null hypothesis of weak instruments. For each regression in Table 6, the KP test statistic for weak identification is above Stock and Yogo's (2005) demanding critical value at the 25% max IV size (5.530). In all cases, we then reject the null hypothesis of individual weak identification. The results of the 2SLS estimation show that the early emigration rate has a positive impact on post-1990 democracy, and this is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, even controlling for endogeneity concerns using the 2SLS strategy, we obtain results supporting our finding regarding the contribution of early emigration toward promoting current democracy.

4.3. Difference-in-difference approach

In the previous subsection, we check the robustness of our results to the potential endogeneity issue using the 2SLS strategy. In this subsection, we use the panel fixed effects over the period 1980-2010 in order to address potential additional concerns regarding unobserved heterogeneity. Following Wantchékon and García-Ponce (2014), we consider the following difference-in-differences (DID) approach with fixed effects:

$$Democ_{it} = v_i + \tau_t + \theta\left(Emig_{1980,i}{\times}Post1990_t\right) + \Phi X_{it}$$
$$+ \Psi(W_i{\times}Post1990_t) + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{4}$$

where v_i are the country fixed effects that control for both the observable and unobservable county factors; τ_t is the time fixed effects that capture year common specific shocks; $Post1990$ is a dummy that takes on a value of 0 for the years before 1990, and 1 otherwise; the interaction term $Emig_{1980,i}{\times}Post1990_t$ allows us to obtain the contribution of emigration to access to democracy in the post-Cold War era; X_{it} is a set of time-varying controls; W_i contains time-invariant controls; and ε_{it} is an error term. A positive θ would mean that the pre-1990 stock of emigrants has positively affected the transition to democracy in Africa in the post-Cold War period. We estimate Equation 4 by OLS, and we use Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors.

Table 7 exhibits the results of DID approach. The VA index is not considered in Table 8 because it only became available in 1996. These results support the previous findings, which show a positive and significant effect of the stock of emigrants in 1980 on the contemporary levels of democracy in the African countries.

Table 7: Difference-in-differences estimation

	(1) P2	(2) P2	(3) PR	(4) PR	(5) CL	(6) CL
Emig. 1980 x Post-1990	2.669***	0.916*	5.331***	3.844***	4.940***	4.046***
	(0.373)	(0.520)	(0.488)	(0.546)	(0.393)	(0.411)
Ln GDP pc	0.045	0.090***	0.095***	0.138***	0.091***	0.099***
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Ln population	-0.372**	-0.632***	-0.016	-0.285*	0.074	-0.071
	(0.157)	(0.150)	(0.141)	(0.146)	(0.092)	(0.098)
Trade	0.001***	0.002***	0.001***	0.002***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil rents	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.006***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time invariant var. x Post-1990		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,124	1,041	1,156	1,042	1,156	1,042
R-squared	0.486	0.203	0.322	0.408	0.502	0.549
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of countries	40	37	41	41	41	37

Notes: The dependent variable is the post-1990 democracy index, measured as the average level of the corresponding democracy index for each country between 1991 and 2010. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.

5. Underlying mechanisms

5.1. Long-term effect

In this study, we argue that the greater the stock of emigrants in the 1970-1980s, the more likely the success of the democratic transitions of the 1990-2000s. This assumption is based on the arguments developed in Section 2, notably that it took several years of investments by emigrants to establish an independent civil society during the years of dictatorship. Apart from this argument, which may seem specific to the African democratic transitions of the 1990s, it makes sense to conceive that in general terms, the relationship between emigration and democracy might not be "a one by one relationship" in the sense that people who emigrate today do not immediately cause democracy in their countries of origin.

Indeed, regardless of the reasons behind the emigration, it is quite conceivable that a migrant in a host country needs an adjustment period. In some cases, this period can be lengthy, especially because it may, in some cases, include the resumption of studies, job searches, learning the habits and customs of the host country, and so on. These life components should not be considered as given, because they may require several years of investment by migrants before they can be fulfilled. In this case, the role of emigrants in the democracy of their countries of origin may appear to be more effective if they belong to the oldest waves. In other words, the longer the duration of the emigrant population, the greater the impact could be on democracy, *ceteris paribus*.

Table 8: Long term effect

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	P2	P2	P2	PR	PR	PR	CL	CL	CL	VA	VA	VA
Emig. 1980	4.635***			5.901***			4.125***			3.048***		
	(1.159)			(1.224)			(0.829)			(0.634)		
Emig. 1985		2.633***			3.663***			2.640***			1.870***	
		(0.961)			(0.904)			(0.634)			(0.425)	
Emig. 1990			2.215*			3.230**			2.297**			1.738***
			(1.226)			(1.281)			(0.919)			(0.577)
Ln GDP pc	-0.021	-0.020	-0.019	0.035	0.038	0.032	0.053	0.054	0.050	0.036	0.037	0.034
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Ln population	-0.002	-0.007	-0.009	-0.014	-0.018	-0.015	-0.016	-0.019	-0.017	0.001	-0.001	0.001
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Trade	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnic. frac.	0.021	0.035	0.042	0.069	0.088	0.099	0.066	0.080	0.088	0.017	0.027	0.033
	(0.193)	(0.203)	(0.207)	(0.170)	(0.179)	(0.182)	(0.121)	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.093)
Constant	0.754	0.810	0.845	0.383	0.436	0.428	0.343	0.372	0.370	0.114	0.143	0.129
	(0.759)	(0.771)	(0.778)	(0.734)	(0.742)	(0.747)	(0.549)	(0.556)	(0.559)	(0.383)	(0.389)	(0.390)
Observations	40	40	40	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
R-squared	0.126	0.098	0.084	0.189	0.168	0.157	0.230	0.216	0.205	0.222	0.198	0.195

Notes: The dependent variable is the post-1990 democracy index, measured as the average level of the corresponding democracy index for each country between 1991 and 2010. For time-varying control variables, the regressions use their average values between 1991 and 2010. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.

In Table 8, we empirically test this proposition by regressing the recent level of democracy, the average from 1991-2010, on the stocks of emigrants from the preceding periods, i.e. the stock in 1980, in 1985, and in 1990. To save space while reporting more precise estimations, Table 8 considers the narrow set of control variables used in Table 3. The results in Table 8 support the hypothesis of a greater effect from the oldest stocks of emigrants. For example, based on the Polity 2 index as the dependent variable, the stock of 1980 is associated with a coefficient of 4.64, much higher than that of 1985, which is 2.63; this coefficient itself is higher than that of 1990, which is 2.22.

5.2. The channel of the empowerment of the civil society

The previous sections have provided consistent evidence of the significant positive effect of the early emigration share on democracy transition in Africa. To explain this relationship, we argue that emigration has promoted democracy in Africa through the channel of the emergence of an independent civil society. To test this mechanism, we conduct two sets of regressions, using the

same controls as above. Firstly, we start by regressing the level of the independence of civil society over the post-1990 period on pre-1990 emigration rate, in order to confirm that pre-1990 emigration has helped to promote the emergence of an independent civil society. Secondly, we regress the post-1990 democracy score on the level of the independence of civil society, while adding the pre-1990 emigration. This second set of regressions aims to confirm the positive association between democracy and the independence of civil society, and to support the fact that the democracy-promoting impact of pre-1990 emigration operated through the civil society channel. If in presence of the level of the independence of civil society, the marginal impact of emigration on democracy diminishes or vanishes, this would provide evidence of a channel that works through the emergence of an independent civil society.

Table 9 reports the results of the regressions of the independence of civil society on early emigration rate, when Table 10 exhibits the results of the regressions of the democracy score on the score of the independence of civil, while controlling for the early emigration rate. The results in Table 9 clearly show that pre-1990 emigration has a high significant positive impact on the level of the independence of civil society. This holds for both OLS and 2SLS regressions. Thus, the results in Table 9 show that the pre-1990 emigration has helped to promote the emergence of an independent civil society as documented in the section 2.

Regarding Table 10, as reported in columns 1 and 2, the independence of civil society appears to be an important factor in promoting transition to democracy in SSA Africa as the coefficient associated with the variable CCS (core of civil society) is highly significant and positive. Additionally, the results in columns 3-5 support evidence that the democracy-promoting impact of pre-1990 emigration operated through the development of an independent civil society. Indeed, by comparing the preceding results (see Tables 3, 4 and 6) to those in columns 3-5 of Table 10; we find that, in presence of civil society as a covariate, the estimated impact of emigration on democracy score (Polity 2 score) diminishes in magnitude and significance.

In sum, the results in Tables 9 and 10 support evidence that emigration has promoted transition to democracy in Africa through the channel of the emergence of an independent civil society. This finding thus corroborates our conjecture that the diaspora, prior to the wave of democratic transition in Africa, positively impacts the contemporaneous democracy level through the emergence of an independent civil society.

Table 9: Emigration and empowerment of the civil society

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS
Emig. 1980	5.528***	5.921***	2.676***	5.536***	7.430***
	(0.567)	(1.092)	(0.915)	(1.279)	(2.160)
Ln GDP pc		0.021	0.054		0.019
		(0.046)	(0.054)		(0.042)
Ln population		0.027	-0.010		0.036
		(0.036)	(0.036)		(0.034)
Trade		0.001	-0.002		0.001
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)
Ethnic. frac.		-0.058	0.379**		-0.057
		(0.156)	(0.166)		(0.142)
Dist. equator			0.009**		
			(0.003)		
Oil rents			-0.002		
			(0.002)		
French leg. origin			-0.034		
			(0.065)		
Rural ins.			-0.160**		
			(0.058)		
Observations	45	38	32	45	38
R-squared	0.142	0.183	0.512	0.142	0.173
K-P F-stat				9.128	29.22
SY 10% max IV size				16.38	16.38
SY 25% max IV size				5.530	5.530

Notes: The dependent variable is the pre-1990 core civil society (CCS) index (annual average between 1980 and 1989). For time-varying control variables, the regressions use their average values between 1980 and 1989. Emigration rate in 1980 is instrumented by the predicted value of emigration rate that is obtained by the non-linear gravity estimates. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. K-P F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat that is to be compared with critical values (SY 10% max IV size and SY 25% max IV size) provided by Stock and Yogo (2005).

Table 10: Emigration, empowerment of the civil society and democracy

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS
CCS	0.858***	0.716***	0.827***	0.664***	0.820***
	(0.130)	(0.221)	(0.134)	(0.227)	(0.121)
Emig. 1980			1.606*	1.906*	1.958*
			(0.875)	(0.987)	(1.071)
Ln GDP pc	-0.045	-0.046	-0.048	-0.049	-0.048
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.044)
Ln population	-0.019	-0.025	-0.011	-0.015	-0.009
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Trade	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnic. frac.	-0.193	-0.164	-0.187	-0.116	-0.185*
	(0.118)	(0.211)	(0.118)	(0.232)	(0.107)
Dist. equator		0.010**		0.011**	
		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Oil rents		0.000		-0.000	
		(0.003)		(0.003)	
French leg. origin		-0.007		-0.013	
		(0.059)		(0.061)	
Rural ins.		-0.002		-0.003	
		(0.078)		(0.077)	
Observations	39	36	39	36	39
R-squared	0.553	0.623	0.563	0.638	0.563
K-P F-stat					59.15
SY 10% max IV size					16.38
SY 25% max IV size					5.530

Notes: The dependent variable is the post-1990 Polity 2 index (average between 1991 and 2010). In columns (5), emigration rate in 1980 is instrumented by the predicted value of emigration rate that is obtained by the non-linear gravity estimates. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. K-P F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat that is to be compared with critical values (SY 10% max IV size and SY 25% max IV size) provided by Stock and Yogo (2005).

6. Conclusion

This paper supports the proposition that long-standing emigrants have positively affected the outcomes of democratic transitions in the Sub-Saharan African countries. Specifically, the evidence supports the position that a larger population of emigrants enabled citizens to develop an independent civil society during autocratic rule. In contrast, a smaller emigrant population during autocratic rule did not allow such developments. In this case, the incumbents retained their bargaining power and determined the agenda of the transitions; consequently, institutional changes were less likely to occur.

We test this conjecture in a sample of 47 Sub-Saharan Africa countries using the wave of democracy in the 1990s as a quasi-natural experiment. The results demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between the stock of African migrants in the OECD countries during the 1970-1980s and the contemporary levels of democracy in their countries of origin. This

relationship is explained by the role of emigrants in the emergence of an independent civil society. Additionally, the marginal effect of emigration on democracy decreases according to the duration of the migrant population in the host countries: the longer the duration of the migrant population, the greater the impact on democracy, *ceteris paribus*. Various robustness checks confirm this finding.

These results suggest that migrants might be among the conditions for the success of contemporary democratic transitions. One can argue that migrants might be among those who have better information about the state of the international upheavals, and they might simultaneously be among the few that have better knowledge about the constraints and opportunities in their countries of origin. Accounting for their role could avoid institutional diffusion in one-fit-way, which usually results in failure.

Appendix

A-1. List of countries

The countries considered are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

A-2. Gravity estimation

Table A-1 reports the results of the gravity model used to predict bilateral migration stocks in 1980. The estimation is implemented using the non-linear approach of the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML).

Table A-1: Gravity estimation (1980)

	PPML
Ln distance	-2.291***
	(0.881)
Ln pop. orig.	0.384**
	(0.153)
Ln area orig.	-0.775***
	(0.144)
Colony ties	3.713***
	(0.344)
Constant	12.642
	(8.447)
Observations	846
R-squared	0.736
Destination dummies	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is the 1980 stock of emigrants as share of home population. Robust standard errors clustered by destination country are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.

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